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Pay-for-performance programs are gradually spreading across Asia.  This paper builds on the 
longer experience in the United States to offer lessons for Asia.  The Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services has introduced several pay-for-performance programs in the last few years to 
encourage hospitals to improve quality of care and reduce costs.  Some state Medicaid programs 
have also introduced pay-for-performance for nursing homes.  Long-term care providers play an 
important role in hospital pay-for-performance programs because they can affect the readmission 
rate and also total episode payments.  A good pay-for-performance program will focus on 
improving quality of care that affects health outcomes.  In addition, that quality must vary across 
providers and be measurable.  Furthermore, it is important that the measures be reported in a 
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adjusted.  Empirical data from Medicare beneficiaries in thestate of Michigan show that mean 
episode payments and readmission rates in skilled nursing facilities vary widely and are sensitive 
to the number of observations.  These practical matters create challenges for implementing pay-
for-performance in practice.   There is an extensive literature review of pay-for-performance in 
long-term care in the United States and in Asia.  
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Pay-for-performance programs are gradually spreading across Asia.  This paper builds on the 
longer experience in the United States to offer lessons for Asia.  The Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services has introduced several pay-for-performance programs in the last few years to 
encourage hospitals to improve quality of care and reduce costs.  Some state Medicaid programs 
have also introduced pay-for-performance for nursing homes.  Long-term care providers play an 
important role in hospital pay-for-performance programs because they can affect the readmission 
rate and also total episode payments.  A good pay-for-performance program will focus on 
improving quality of care that affects health outcomes.  In addition, that quality must vary across 
providers and be measurable.  Furthermore, it is important that the measures be reported in a 
timely way, that both demand and supply respond to the measures, and that the measures be risk 
adjusted.  Empirical data from Medicare beneficiaries in the state of Michigan show that mean 
episode payments and readmission rates in skilled nursing facilities vary widely and are sensitive 
to the number of observations.  These practical matters create challenges for implementing pay-
for-performance in practice.   There is an extensive literature review of pay-for-performance in 
long-term care in the United States and in Asia.  
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 Pay-for-performance programs, which explicitly create financial incentives for health 
care providers based on measured outcomes, are gradually spreading across Asia.  Pay-for-
performance programs have the promise of improving quality of care, lowering total episode 
expenditures, and providing information to providers for continual quality improvement.  They 
are also typically structured to be budget neutral, making them popular among policymakers.  
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challenges when compared to acute care because long-term care patients typically have chronic 
conditions and worse prognosis.  Although pay-for-performance in long-term care is starting to 
become important in Asia, there is not yet a lot of evidence to assess the experience there. This 
paper therefore builds on the longer experience in the United States to offer lessons for 
successful pay-for-performance programs in Asia, while also reviewing the extant literature in 
Asia. 
 The Medicare insurance program, which covers elderly persons and some non-elderly 
disabled in the United States, is undergoing a profound change in how it pays for health care.  
Traditionally, Medicare has paid for most health care based on quantity of services performed.  
More services  visits, tests, days, drugs, and consults  means more reimbursement.  Under 
this system, the incentives for providers are to provide more services.  Quality of care is not 
rewarded directly.  Keeping costs down, on a per-visit or per-episode basis, is not rewarded 
directly.  Without global budgets or caps, and with managed care playing only a modest role in 
the entire system, the overall health care system rewards greater quantity, not greater quality of 
care.  It is perhaps not surprising that the United States health care system is by far the most 
expensive in the world and, by many measures, has poor health outcomes relative to other 
developed nations.  Nor is it surprising that recently policymakers have sought ways to change 
this system to reward quality of care and cost control. 
 In recent years, hospitals in the United States have seen several new initiatives to reward 
both high quality and low episode payments.  These programs are generally known as pay-for-
performance programs, or P4P.  The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) now has 
five main pay-for-performance programs for the Medicare program.  The Hospital Readmission 
Reduction Program (HRRP) aims to reduce the number of readmissions, which are costly and 
often indicate poor quality of care.  The Hospital Value-Based Purchasing (HVBP) program 
encourages both higher quality of care and lower episode payments, where episodes of care 
include 30 days post discharge (Norton et al., forthcoming 2017).  The Comprehensive Care for 
Joint Replacement (CRJ) model provides bundled payments to hospitals, physicians, and post-
acute care providers for treatment of hip and knee replacement, one of the most common surgical 
procedures among elderly patients.  The Hospital-Acquired Condition Reduction (HAC) 
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revenue.  The Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Initiative (BPCI) encourages care 
coordination by paying a fixed amount for a collection of services to treat an episode of illness.   
 These programs all share three important features.  First, they take a more comprehensive 
view of treatment, encompassing not only the index hospital admission, but also the period 
(usually 30 days) post discharge.  This creates incentives to improve coordination of care among 
different providers, traditionally a weakness of the United States health care system.  Second, 
they reward better quality of care.  Quality can be measured in different ways, including lower 
mortality, fewer readmissions, and better patient satisfaction, but the important thing is that 
hospitals have financial incentives to improve quality of care and outcomes.  Third, they reward 
lower episode payments.  The financial incentives for lower episode payments are different 
(financial penalties for readmissions in HRRP, percentage bonus for lower episode payments in 
HVBP, and capitation in CJR), but all in some way reward lower Medicare payments and 
penalize higher Medicare payments. 
 Taken together, these pay-for-performance programs represent a sea change in how 
Medicare pays for major health care episodes.  No longer will providers be able to earn more 
money through high readmission rates, not suffer financially for enduring high mortality rates, or 
not be responsible in part for expensive post-acute care treatment.  Hospitals must now think 
carefully about how to manage other providers, especially skilled nursing facilities, rehabilitation 
centers, and home health agencies, to improve the entire episode of care.   
 Furthermore, although the amount of money at state is currently modest, CMS plans to tie 
85% of fee-for-service Medicare payments to quality or value by 2016 (Burwell, 2015).  The 
trend is for more pay-for-performance in the future, not less.  It is therefore imperative to 
understand the economic incentives in these pay-for-performance programs. 
 While most of the emphasis on pay-for-performance seems to be directed towards 
hospitals, long-term care providers are also an extremely important part of pay-for-performance 
programs.  Long-term care providers matter both directly and indirectly.  Some states have 
started their own pay-for-performance programs for Medicaid  the state and federal insurance 
program for people who fall below certain income thresholds  for nursing home care. In those 
states, nursing homes are directly affected by pay-for-performance.  In addition, for all of the 
hospital pay-for-performance programs, nursing homes and home health agencies are indirectly 
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period.  When hospitals are held accountable for what happens during the post-discharge period, 
they will try to find a way to hold those other providers accountable too. 
 This paper provides an overview of long-term care and pay-for-performance.  It starts 
with a conceptual framework of how pay-for-performance matters for long-term care providers.  
The conceptual framework addresses both direct and indirect incentives.  The literature review 
summarizes how pay-for-performance has worked thus far in long-term care settings.  In addition, 
there is a close look at readmissions in the state of Michigan, where the private insurer Blue 
Cross Blue Shield of Michigan has started its own pay-for-performance program for all hospitals.  
This study of Michigan demonstrates the many issues and challenges in trying to measure quality 
of care in long-term care facilities, report the information to hospitals, and have hospitals judged 
in part on whether skilled nursing facilities have high quality and low cost.  There is also a 
review of pay-for-performance programs in Asian countries. 
 
Conceptual Framework 
 This conceptual framework begins with a discussion of how pay-for-performance directly 
affects nursing homes, when the pay-for-performance program is targeted directly at the nursing 
homes.  First, it is necessary that quality of care matters.  While this may seem obvious, or 
tautological, it is essential that actual quality of care affects outcomes (health, satisfaction, and 
episode spending) in a meaningful way.  One reason why this relationship in nursing homes is 
not always obvious is that in nursing homes, death is an expected outcome for many residents.  
Even high-quality nursing homes have high mortality rates.   Furthermore, satisfaction of 
patients who have dementia may not be as responsive to actual quality as patients with no 
cognitive problems.  But setting aside those issues, we take it as given that improved quality of 
care will also improve patient outcomes, including health, satisfaction, and episode spending. 
 Second, there needs to be variation in quality of care related to differential investments 
towards improvement.  That is, some nursing homes need to be better than others, and nursing 
homes can expect to improve over time if they put forth effort.  Overall quality of care in nursing 
homes is considered poor, but also quite variable (Grabowski and Norton, 2012).  Again, this 
may seem obvious, but it is essential for an incentive program for there to be variation and for 
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Third, regulators need to be able to measure quality of care.  Measuring quality of care in 
nursing homes is hard.  As already mentioned, focusing solely on outcomes like mortality and 
patient satisfaction could provide misleading measures of quality of care.  Process measures, 
such as regulatory fines or staffing, are fairly easy to measure but provide indirect measures of 
quality that may not be highly correlated with actual quality of care.  Other measures such as 
quality of nurses are notoriously difficult to measure.   But, if quality of care is to be rewarded, it 
must be measured. 
Fourth, quality of care must not only be measured, but measured in a timely way and 
reported back to the regulator and the provider quickly.  If it takes years and years to collect and 
report data, then there cannot be timely improvements.  Using claims data usually requires a one- 
to two-year lag.  The CMS HVBP program has a two-year lag. 
Fifth, there must be response on both the demand and the supply sides to the information 
provided about quality of care.  On the supply side, nursing homes must have incentives that are 
strong enough to want to improve quality of care.  For example, in the CMS HVBP program, 
hospitals can gain performance points either by doing well on an absolute scale, or by improving, 
thus giving incentives to all hospitals to either improve or maintain high quality of care (Das et 
al., 2016).  Konetzka and colleagues (forthcoming 2017) found that different weights for nursing 
home quality measures mattered, with larger weights not surprisingly leading to larger 
improvements in clinical outcomes.  They also found that a simple rule for deficiencies 
(threshold for few or no deficiencies) was more effective than a complicated one.  On the 
demand side, patients must respond to improved quality of care by voting with their feet and 
going to high-quality nursing homes (Werner et al., 2012).  If there is no demand response, then 
there is no reason to create a program to try to improve quality of care. 
 Sixth, the measures of quality of care need to be risk adjusted to allow appropriate 
comparisons conditional on the case mix severity of patients.  Without risk adjustment, nursing 
homes that treat sicker patients may do worse on measured quality of care, not because they are 
worse quality of care, but because the patient population has higher morbidity and worse 
expected health outcomes.  Without risk adjustment, there will always be incentives for nursing 
homes to select healthy patients to achieve a good score through patient selection instead of 
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 If all six of those conditions are met, then a pay-for-performance program aimed at 
improving quality of care in nursing homes could work.  
 The payment side of pay-for-performance has somewhat different issues.  Payments are 
relatively easy to measure because there is a paper trail.  Administrative data keeps close track of 
all payments.  The demand side response is not really relevant for Medicare or Medicaid episode 
payments, because consumers only respond to out-of-pocket payments (although out-of-pocket 
payments are usually highly correlated with insurer payments).  The insurer (Medicaid or 
Medicare) wants lower total payments.  Furthermore, payments tend to be the same for the same 
service, eliminating basic variation in per unit prices.  However, to the extent that there is price 
variation (e.g., due to cost of living adjustments, teaching adjustments, inflation across years) 
those should be eliminated by price standardization, which assigns the same average price to the 
same service (Chen et al., 2017).  The real issue with trying to reduce payments is how to do it in 
a way that does not compromise quality of care.  If reducing payments means discharging too 
early from a nursing home, then that could lead to higher morbidity and mortality. 
 The economic issues and incentives for pay-for-performance programs aimed at hospitals 
are different.  In these programs, the direct incentives are for hospitals, and nursing homes are 
only affected indirectly.  However, the same list of six issues from above still applies.  Assume 
that quality of care matters, that there is variation, that quality can be measured in a timely way, 
that there is response on both the supply and demand sides of the market, and that measures are 
risk adjusted.  For long-term care providers, the issues are mostly about post-acute care.  Because 
of incentives, hospitals now care about quality and episode payments, so they want to steer 
patients to the kind of treatment that will minimize the chance of readmissions and episode 
payments (at least up to 30 days).  Hospitals can achieve some of this during the index 
hospitalization.  The better the initial surgery and the better the information provided to the 
patient, the better the post-acute care experience.   
However, there are two ways that hospitals can influence what happens during the post-
acute care period (Rahman, Norton, Grabowski, 2016).  First, they can steer patients to different 
post-acute care providers.  Hospital discharge planners have enormous influence over what 
happens to patients upon discharge.  They can nudge patients towards different types of care (e.g., 
home health vs. skilled nursing facility) or to different specific providers within a type of care.  
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This could be through information or threats of withholding patient referrals.  The goal would be 
to change the practice of the provider if a patient is sent there. 
These two ways of influencing post-acute care  changing the probability of the 
provider and changing the type of care conditional on the provider  could be done informally 
or done formally through contracts.  At the extreme, hospitals can buy or build a nursing home, 
creating a hospital-based nursing home.  Or they can contract with existing non-hospital-based 
nursing homes to try to ensure quality of care. 
 Having laid out the main issues facing pay-for-performance programs for long-term care 
providers, we next turn to a literature review of the experience of pay-for-performance.  In 
particular, the next section addresses what pay-for-performance programs look like in terms of 
measures of quality, incentives, and reporting.  The section also summarizes what has happened 




The United States is not only a pioneer in developing pay-for-performance programs for 
inpatient care, but it is also one of the only countries that has created pay-for-performance 
programs specifically for long-term care providers (Briesacher et al., 2009).  As of 2010, 14 (out 
of 50) state Medicaid programs had enacted pay-for-performance programs or were planning 
them.  Medicaid provides means-tested health insurance, with combined state and federal 
funding (Werner et al. 2010).  Vermont was the first state to have a pay-for-performance 
program, in 2000.  The nine states with existing pay-for-performance programs have about 20% 
of all nursing homes.  The remaining five states that were planning to implement as of 2010 have 
about 15% of all nursing homes.  Therefore, a significant fraction of nursing home residents who 
are covered by Medicaid are in nursing homes subject to pay-for-performance.  Medicaid pays 
for roughly half of all nursing home days, but its reimbursement is lower than private payers by 
roughly 10% to 30% (Norton, 2000). 
The details of the pay-for-performance programs vary widely, yet all the programs share 
certain core features (Werner et al., 2010).  Each program employs a variety of measures to try to 
capture quality of care.  Each state uses at least three, most at least four.  Nearly all use staffing, 
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measure as they are collected for other purposes.  Other measures used include clinical process 
measures, occupancy, efficiency, and Medicaid use.   
Most states assign points to nursing homes for either achieving a certain threshold or 
being among the highest ranked (Werner et al., 2010).  Points are only awarded for top 
performers, not for low performers who nonetheless improve (as is often done in hospital pay-
for-performance programs).  One problem of this system is that it gives little incentive for a low 
performing nursing home to improve at the margin (Norton et al., forthcoming 2017).  The 
amount of money spent on the financial bonuses is modest, ranging from 0.1 percent to 1.8 
percent (Werner et al., 2010).  An important policy question is whether the incentives have 
spurred improvements in quality of care or lowered overall payments. 
In a large-scale study of the effects of pay-for-performance for nursing homes by eight 
state Medicaid agencies during the decade of the 2000s, Werner and colleagues (2013) found 
only a few measures improved.  They found that three clinical quality measures improved.  They 
showed that the use of restraints, development of pressure sores, and number patients in 
moderate to severe pain all declined.  However, neither of the two structural measures  nurse 
staffing and number of deficiencies  that were directly linked to points improved.  Other health 
measures either did not improve or got worse.  In sum, the results were decidedly mixed and 
somewhat disappointing.  Werner and colleagues (2013) speculate that the incentives may have 
been too small, the results of measures not timely enough, or that it could be necessary to 
provide financial incentives directly to staff instead of to the organization.  
 Evaluation of Medicaid pay-for-performance programs by Werner and colleagues (2016) 
has revealed another interesting design issue.  One challenge with creating incentives is to make 
positive incentives for all nursing homes, including those that are starting at a high level of 
quality of care and those that are starting at a low level.  Take a threshold system, where nursing 
homes that achieve a certain threshold get a bonus.  If the bonus is hard to attain, so that only a 
small fraction of nursing homes can realistically surpass the threshold, then nursing homes that 
start at a low level of quality may feel that they have no chance and will not try.  In economic 
terms, the return on investment is too great to bother investing.  On the other hand, if the 
threshold is modest, so that some nursing homes easily surpass it, then those at the top have no 
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comparing results across six states.  Nursing homes well above the threshold got worse, although 
those well below the threshold seemed to have enough incentive to try to improve. 
There is only one prior peer-reviewed study that has rigorously evaluated a pay-for-
performance program in nursing homes, comparing treatment and control nursing homes (Norton, 
1992).  The nursing homes were given monetary incentives to improve the health of nursing 
home residents and lower Medicaid expenditures.  Results showed shows that the incentives 
improved the quality of care and reduced Medicaid expenditures on nursing homes.  Furthermore, 
the study found that nursing homes admitted more people with severe disabilities and that their 
average length of their stay was shortened.  This sort of pay-for-performance program is 
consistent with the goal of transferring more people out of hospitals and into nursing homes, 
which serve as a lower-cost substitute. 
While most nursing home pay-for-performance programs are run by state Medicaid 
programs, a recent study by Grabowski and colleagues (2017) evaluated the Medicare Value-
Based Purchasing Program demonstration in three states (Arizona, New York, and Wisconsin).  
The purpose of the program was to provide incentives to improve quality of care and lower 
Medicare spending.  The study found no change in measured quality of care.  There were 
declines in Medicare spending in the first year for treatment nursing homes in Arizona, and for 
the first two years in Wisconsin, but no change in New York or in the long run in any state.  The 
authors also interviewed administrators and concluded that few nursing homes made any 
appreciable effort to change, so finding so significant results should not be a surprise.   The 
program as designed was not effective. 
As hospitals are increasingly held accountable for patients' post-discharge outcomes 
under pay-for-performance programs, hospitals may want to direct patients to certain skilled 
nursing facilities (SNFs) at discharge to better manage these outcomes.  This raises the question 
of whether patients discharged to hospital-based SNFs have better outcomes.  Rahman, Norton, 
and Grabowski (2016) found that hospital-based skilled nursing facility patients spent about five 
more days in the community and six fewer days in the SNF in the 180 days following their 
original hospital discharge.  They found no significant effect on mortality or hospital readmission, 
and yet Medicare spent almost $2,900 less on a hospital-based SNF patient in the 30 days 
following their original hospital discharge.  The analysis controlled for selection into hospital-
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 The research question of whether hospital-based SNFs produce better outcomes with 
lower Medicare payments is important given recent pay-for-performance policies that hold 
hospitals accountable for post-hospital discharge outcomes and spending.  The results of Rahman, 
Norton, and Grabowski (2016) provide some support for vertical integration of hospitals and 
SNFs.  Hospitals can consider several ways to partner with SNFs, including ownership or other 
contractual arrangements with freestanding SNFs.  Hospital networks are currently developing 
strategies to develop networks of SNF partners (Maly et al., 2012; Lage et al., 2015). 
CMS is committed to tying Medicare payments to the value of care delivered.  One of 
CMS’s major initiatives is the Hospital Value-based Purchasing Program (HVBP), which pays 
financial bonuses to hospitals based on their quality of care and the episode-based payments of 
care.  Norton and colleagues (forthcoming 2017) argue that every Medicare patient affects their 
hospital’s performance on a variety of quality and spending measures.  The change in these 
measures translates directly to changes in program points and eventually to dollars of Medicare 
reimbursement.  Every Medicare patient affects the hospital reimbursement through that patient’s 
marginal future reimbursement.  Norton and colleagues (forthcoming 2017) estimate the 
magnitude of the marginal future reimbursement for individual patients for each quality and 
efficiency measure.  Their method can be generalized to any other pay-for-performance program.   
One concern of all pay-for-performance programs is whether the incentives are large 
enough to cause hospitals to change their behavior, as was discussed in the section on conceptual 
framework.  It is necessary that providers respond to the incentives.  Norton and colleagues 
(forthcoming 2017) found some evidence that hospitals improved their performance over time in 
the areas where they have the highest marginal incentives to improve care.   
The results of Norton and colleagues (forthcoming 2017) align with several of the issues 
presented in the conceptual framework.  There is great variation across providers in the measures, 
and these risk-adjusted measures are strongly linked to quality of care.  The measures are 
measurable in a fairly timely way.  Finally, there is some evidence of supply-side response. 
Two of the implications of rewarding quality of care over an episode of care, which 
requires coordination across multiple providers, are that hospitals that have already integrated 
with post-acute care providers will perform better, and that some hospitals will have strong 
incentives to integrate more with post-acute care providers (Norton et al., forthcoming 2017).  
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informal contracts.  The HVBP program is especially important for the considering coordination 
with long-term care providers because the HVBP applies to almost all general hospitals. 
 
Empirical Work 
 To investigate some of these ideas further, it is instructive to look at Medicare data on 
nursing home use by elderly persons.  SNFs play an important role in the post-acute care of 
elderly persons because any Medicare beneficiary who has a hospital stay of at least three days is 
fully covered by Medicare for the first 20 days, and then the next 80 days are partly subsidized.  
Specifically, this analysis looks at two outcomes:  episode payments and readmission rates, each 
at the level of the skilled nursing facility (SNF).  From a hospital’s perspective, these are the two 
most important outcomes that affect pay-for-performance measures that are plausibly affected by 
SNF quality.  There is evidence that observed risk-adjusted readmission rates from a SNF back 
to a hospital signal differences in quality, not just patient severity (Rahman, Grabowski, et al., 
2016).  Hospitals want to send discharged patients to nursing homes that will have short lengths 
of stay and that will not readmit the patients.   
 Consider a hospital’s discharge planning decision.  If the hospital is considering 
discharging a patient to one of two nursing homes, and if that hospital knows that one nursing 
home has lower average payments for post-acute care, then they would want their patient to go to 
that nursing home, ceteris paribus.  Similarly, if the hospital knew that one nursing home had 
lower average readmission rates, then again they would want their patient to go to that nursing 
home.  Of course, it would be important for the measures of payments and readmission rates to 
be price standardized and risk adjusted.  A hospital with accurate information about those 
important outcomes could presumably improve their pay-for-performance measures of episode 
payments and lower their readmission rates. 
 Therefore, the analysis will look at those two outcomes averaged at the SNF level.  Using 
these data it will answer four questions.  First, how much variation is there in these measures 
across SNFs?  Second, if all SNFs with episode payments, or with readmission rates, above the 
overall average reduced their numbers to the overall average, how much improvement would 
there be?  Third, how much of the variation can be explained by small sample sizes?   Fourth, 
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 These questions get at the essential theoretical issues discussed in the conceptual 
framework.  It is necessary that there is variation across SNFs in measures, and that the variation 
be largely systematic instead of random.  In short, there needs to be a high signal to noise ratio. 
The Medicare data are for elderly persons in the state of Michigan, which is located 
among the Great Lakes in the upper Midwestern region of the United States.  Michigan is the 
10th largest state by population and the 11th largest by land area (see Figure 1).  I obtained 
Medicare claims data for Michigan Medicare beneficiaries, from July 2010 through June 2015, 
for a total of five years.   
 The data set consists of all Medicare SNF episodes following a hospital stay for one of 
seven major conditions: joint replacement, coronary artery bypass graft (CABG), acute 
myocardial infarction (AMI), pneumonia, congestive heart failure, colectomy, and spine surgery.  
These conditions were chosen because they are common, expensive, include both surgical and 
medical conditions, and are used in the Michigan Value Collaborative as the main conditions 
used in the Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan pay-for-performance program.  In short, these 
are conditions that matter from both a clinical perspective and from an economic perspective.   
The data are aggregated up to the SNF level (or in some cases the SNF-year level).  Due 
to the potential problem of small sample sizes, I eliminated SNFs that had fewer than 10 
admissions during this time period, as is typically done.  Because the data are originally collected 
at the episode level, it is possible for some individuals to appear in the data more than once.  The 
original sample includes 194,213 SNF episodes; after excluding observations from small SNFs 
(many of which are not located in Michigan); the final sample has 190,174 episodes in 581 
unique SNFs. 
 The results start with average episode SNF payments.  Because the payments are price 
standardized, the amount of payment is basically a linear function of the number of days in the 
SNF.  Price standardization uses the same price per day for the same service.  There are no 
differences in payments due to cost of living adjustments, rural adjustments, teaching 
adjustments, or any other adjustments.  However, the results are not risk adjusted.    Risk 
adjustment would attempt to adjust for case mix, essentially rewarding SNFs that admit sicker 
patients by adjusting their episode payments to reflect greater expected payments.   While it is 
possible that the results would differ with case mix adjustment, in my experience case mix 
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(greater acuity) and staying shorter (due to death and readmission).  Patients who died after being 
admitted to a nursing home are included in the analysis.  Even without risk adjustments, the main 
points of the analysis remain.  
 The variation in mean episode payments for SNFs is wide.  The interquartile range is 
about $3,725 (from $11,693 to $15,418) (see Figure 2).  The mean Medicare payments are about 
$13,233, for an average of 28 days.  If the SNF-level mean accurately reflects differences in 
SNFs in how they treat patients  and are not due to case mix differences or random variation 
(issues that we will explore further)  then this observed variation would be extremely 
important for hospitals that are trying to reduce post-acute care episode payments on SNFs.  As 
an example, suppose that hospitals refused to send patients to SNFs with above-the-mean 
payments, and instead sent them to SNFs that are exactly at the mean.  This is equivalent to 
truncating the entire distribution in Figure 2 at the mean.  In that case the new mean would be 
only $11,934, for a reduction of about $1,300 or about 10%.  That is, reducing the highest 
spending down to the mean would reduce overall spending on SNFs by about 10%. 
 Could some of that variation be due to small sample size?  One way to explore this is to 
graph average SNF payments by the number of patients.  We know that small samples have 
higher variance than large samples, but it is not obvious how large a sample one needs before the 
SNF-level means stabilize.  The answer is that one needs several hundred observations, as shown 
in Figure 3.  SNFs with fewer than 200 observations have wide variation, too wide to have any 
confidence that the estimates represent only SNF-specific quality of care.  SNFs with more than 
1,000 observations have small variation, but relatively few SNFs have that many.  Further 
compounding the problem is that many pay-for-performance measures are measured on annual 
data, whereas the measures presented in this analysis are from a full five years.  Data based on a 
single year would be far more variable. 
 Another simple way to investigate the stability of the SNF-level estimates is to plot one 
year’s estimate against the prior year’s estimate.  If the estimates are a perfect signal of 
immutable SNF quality, then the estimates will align along the 45 degree line.  If the estimates 
are pure random noise, with no SNF-specific information, then the estimates will form a round 
ball of points.  The results show strong correlation (about 0.648) and with wider variation for 
higher values (see Figure 4).  That is, the signal is fairly strong, but there is still much year-to-
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observations, the plotted points are much more tightly grouped around the 45 degree line (results 
not shown). 
 The story is similar for the SNF-level readmission rates.  Overall 30-day readmission 
rates are about 14.6%, meaning that about one in seven Medicare patients who go to a SNF for 
post-acute care following a hospitalization for one of the seven conditions listed above will be 
readmitted to the hospital within 30 days.  To be clear, these are readmissions that occur after 
going to the SNF.   
 Again, the variation in SNF-level readmission rates is wide, with most of the variation in 
the range of 10% to 20% (see Figure 5).  This substantial variation is based on five years of 
aggregated data, and could be due to both differences in SNF quality of care in avoiding 
readmissions, as well as unmeasured case mix and random noise.  If all patients who went to a 
SNF with above-average readmission rates instead went to SNFs with exactly average rates, then 
the mean readmission rates would fall from 14.6% to 13.2%, for a decline of 1.4%, or again 
about a ten-percent reduction. 
 The variance of the estimated SNF-level readmission rates is inversely related to the 
number of patients, as shown in Figure 6.  Again, the variance is extremely high in the many 
SNFs with fewer than 200 observations.   
 The results highlight some of the concerns and problems with pay-for-perofrmance 
measures in practice.  Referring back to the second and third conditions for a successful pay-for-
performance program in the conceptual framework, the analysis of Michigan data shows that it is 
not sufficient to have variation in quality across providers (condition 2) and be able to measure 
that quality (condition 3).  The sample size must be sufficiently large to accurately measure 
provider-specific quality.  Small sample sizes (small per provider) will yield unstable 
measurements, will unfairly reward providers who happen to have an unusally favoarable draw 
of patients.  The lessons for Asia are clear.  It is important to have large sample sizes per 
provider so that the best and worst performing providers are not just due to random chance. 
 
Pay-for-Performance in Asia 
 Pay-for-performance programs are still relatively new in Asia, if they are to be found at 
all.  This section provides a literature review of pay-for-performance programs in Asia and the 
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Japan 
 In 2008, Japan began a nationwide pay-for-performance program to improve the health 
outcomes of stroke patients (Milstein and Schreyoegg, 2016).  Hospitals are rewarded on the 
basis of improved clinical process measures and on patient health outcomes.  Specifically, 
hospitals were expected to discharge at least 60% of participating stroke survivors to the 
community, to hospitalize at least 15% of severe stroke patients, and have at least 30% of 
patients show improvement in activities of daily living or functional recovery by the time of 
discharge (Jeong et al., 2010).  When compared to other pay-for-performance programs, the 
Japanese stroke program has a relatively small financial incentive, with potential bonuses less 
than 1% and no penalties. 
 One study showed positive effects of Japan’s pay-for-performance program on clinical 
process measures, but no effect on health outcomes (Inoue et al. 2011).  That study also found 
evidence that providers selected into the program patients who are good risks for improved 
health outcomes. 
 Although Japan does now have long-term care insurance (Hanaoka and Norton, 2008), 
and most stroke victims are elderly, the Japanese stroke pay-for-performance program does not 
specifically target long-term care providers.  However, Japan introduced two pay-f r-
performance programs for public long-term care services in April 2006.  One program pays long-
term care facilities an increased rate if the fraction of patients who have stroke rehabilitation 
exceeds a certain threshold.  The other program rewards high-performing long-term care 
institutions that provide prevention programs through day care services.  Another program was 
implemented just in Shiga prefecture in 2012, where providers received a bonus for better 
outcomes.  However, Iizuka and colleagues (2017) found no overall effect on health outcomes 




 Korea began a limited pay-for-performance program in 2007 (Lee et al., 2012).  The 
Ministry of Health and the Health Insurance Review & Assessment Service (HIRA) focused on 
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Those conditions were chosen because Korea ranked relatively poorly for those two conditions 
among OECD countries (Milstein and Schreyoegg, 2016).  The goal was to improve health 
outcomes and to reduce the variation across tertiary teaching hospitals.  The amount of revenue 
at stake was up to 2%, with up to 1% bonus for high-performing hospitals and up to 1% penalty 
for poor-performing hospitals (Lee et al., 2012; Milstein and Schreyoegg, 2016).  Only tertiary 
teaching hospitals were involved. 
Based on the initial success with improving care for AMI and reducing the rate of C-
sections in teaching hospitals, Korea decided to expand the pay-for-performance programs to 
include general hospitals (Lee et al., 2012).  The next conditions added to the program were 
stroke and prophylactic use of antibiotics, but eventually the intent is to include many more 
conditions.  Over time, there are plans to expand to more conditions and to more providers.  The 
number of health care providers included will also expand beyond hospitals. 
 
Taiwan 
 Taiwan has several pay-for-performance programs that are targeted at specific diseases.  
Starting in 2001, the Bureau of National Health Insurance implemented pay-for-performance 
programs for diabetes mellitus, tuberculosis, breast cancer, cervical cancer, and asthma (Lee et 
al., 2010).  Later these programs were expanded to other diseases, including hypertension and 
hepatitis.  The patients with these diseases are mostly treated as outpatients.  The providers are 
paid a bonus if there is significant improvement in the patient’s health outcome.  The bonus 
payments are paid to the medical institutions, not to the medical professionals directly. 
 The Taiwanese experience, however, exposes one major challenge in designing 
appropriate incentives in pay-for-performance programs.  Patients are recruited into the pay-for-
performance program at the request of the medical professional.  Therefore, physicians can select 
those patients who are most likely to earn them a bonus, and exclude those patients who will not.  
Chang and colleagues (2012) studied the first five years of the pay-for-performance program 
(20012005) in Taiwan for patients with diabetes.  Essentially all patients who were enrolled in 
the pay-for-performance program adhered to all process measures.  This result is not that 
impressive, however, considering that less than half of all diabetic patients were actually enrolled 
in the program.  Favorable selection means that the incentives to improve care were only applied 
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 The Taiwan tuberculosis pay-for-performance program went national in 2004, although 
hospitals could choose whether to participate or not.  Li and colleagues (2010) used that source 
of variation in participation to compare health outcomes of patients with tuberculosis, even 
though within participating hospitals only some patients were selected (non-randomly) for 
participation.  They found significant improvement in the cure rate and the average rate of 
treatment for patients in participating hospitals.   
 Currently the National Health Insurance program in Taiwan does not cover nursing home 




 The Singapore Ministry of Health is planning to try pay-for-performance for a few select 
procedures, initially as pilot projects.  For example, starting in November, 2016, they will run a 
bundled payment program for hip fractures as a pilot project.  Therefore, it is too early to have 
any results from this pilot project. 
 
China 
 China’s providers are paid almost exclusively on a fee-for-service basis.  This has led to 
predictable concerns about providers recommending unnecessary diagnostic tests and prescribing 
unnecessary prescription drugs to maximize revenue (Sun et al. 2016; Yip et al. 2014).  
Prescription drugs account for a large fraction of revenues for hospitals and providers.  There is 
belief that fee-for-service reimbursement has caused providers to over-prescribe.  Recently, the 
Chinese government encouraged local governments to pilot test alternative payment methods, 
including pay-for-performance (Yip et al., 2014).   
 There are two recent studies of pilot programs in rural China.  While these studies are 
fairly rigorous, both point out concerns about selection and political interference that may still 
contaminate results.  Sun and colleagues (2016) found that a combination of a global budget and 
pay-for-performance could reduce what had been extremely high prescription drug rates under 
fee-for-service.  These results were for Shandong Province, a relatively wealthy part of eastern 
China in 20112012.  Yip and colleagues (2014) studied a different pilot program in rural 
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a wide variety of measures, including prescribing, spending, visits, and patient satisfaction.  
While the authors found a significant reduction in antibiotic prescriptions, there was only a small 
reduction in total spending and no change in other measures. 
 Like most Asian countries, there is a long-standing tradition in China of adult children 
caring for their aging parents.  Long-term care is relatively new and still uncommon in China.  
There is no long-term care insurance program. 
 
Challenges 
 Having presented a conceptual framework for thinking about pay-for-performance 
programs, reviewed the literature in the United States and in Asia, and analyzed Medicare data 
on readmission rates and spending at the SNF level, it is clear that there are many challenges to 
creating an effective pay-for-performance program.  There are many examples of pay-for-
performance programs that have little or no demonstrated effect on quality or on health outcomes.  
In particular, there appear to be four main challenges. 
 First, it is important to choose measures of quality of care that affect health outcomes and 
to measure them well.  Although quality of individual nurses certainly matters, measuring 
individual quality is nearly impossible.  Instead, pay-for-performance programs have used other 
measures such as staffing, which is easy to measure and has been shown to be related to health 
outcomes, or structural deficiencies, which are also easy to measure but less correlated directly 
with health outcomes.  Using actual rates of health outcomes, such as readmission rates to 
hospital or decubitus ulcer rates, raise concern about favorable selection of patients and small 
number variation. 
 Second, it is important to risk adjust the measures so that providers that care for sicker 
patients are not unduly penalized.  Sicker patients generally have worse health outcomes.  Using 
structural or process measures avoids some of this problem.  Without proper risk adjustment, 
there can be severe selection, as seen in Taiwan.   
 Third, it is important to report the results in a timely way to policymakers, providers, and 
consumers.  If it takes many years for the results to be reported back to the providers, then it is 
impossible to have timely continuous quality improvement.  All stakeholders need transparent 
access to the data to be able to understand it and act upon it.  As discussed in the conceptual 
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sense that CMS reports most of the measures publicly on the Hospital Compare and Nursing 
Home Compare websites. 
 Finally, it is important to get the incentives right.  Too small and the providers will not 
respond because the return on investment will not be worth the effort.  Too large and there is 
concern that providers will go to excessive lengths to game the system and to cherry-pick 
patients through favorable selection.  Most pay-for-performance programs start with small 
financial incentives, perhaps as a conservative approach while learning how best to measure and 
report results, but overall it seems as though incentives are too small. 
 
Conclusion 
 Pay-for-performance will continue to grow in importance as a way for insurers to provide 
incentives for providers to improve quality of care and to lower episode payments.  Over the first 
few years of the pay-for-performance programs, CMS has gradually increased the percentage of 
Medicare payments to hospitals that are at stake.  CMS has stated that their goal is to tie 85% of 
fee-for-service Medicare payments to either quality or value by 2016 (Burwell, 2015).  Many 
states now have pay-for-performance for nursing homes under their Medicaid programs.   Blue 
Cross Blue Shield of Michigan has a required pay-for-performance program for all Michigan 
hospitals. 
 For long-term care providers in the United States, pay-for-performance has become 
important both directly and indirectly.  In addition to the direct incentive effects by Medicaid in 
some states, Medicare’s pay-for-performance programs for hospitals affect long-term care 
providers indirectly.  For example, SNFs provide important post-acute care for many Medicare 
patients.  Many outcomes during the first 30 days post discharge are subject to measure and 
performance bonuses or penalties.  More readmissions and higher 30-day episode payments can 
adversely affect hospitals’ bottom line. 
 However, many challenges remain.  To be effective, the measures must be related to true 
quality of care or cost, have variation across providers, be measureable in a timely way, not be 
too noisy, and be appropriately adjusted for risk.  There are problems with all of these 
requirements, especially for long-term care because of the nature of the quality measures.  State 
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higher validity.  Hospitals are starting to merge or contract with long-term care providers to have 
tighter control over the treatment during the post-acute care period. 
Asian countries currently rely less on pay-for-performance programs than the United 
States, but some are moving in that direction.  Hopefully, over time we can all learn from the 
collective experiences and find ways to improve the measures and incentives in pay-for-
performance programs in long-term care. 
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Figure 4.  Mean episode payments by SNF plotted against lagged values. 
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